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9.1 Introduction 
Since the 1960s, Korea has accomplished remarkable economic growth, 
allowing it to overcome the devastation caused by the Korean War. How- 
ever, the currency crisis of 1997 brought Korea into the most severe hard- 
ship since the Korean War. One factor that could contribute to Korean 
recovery from the financial crisis is a stable flow of foreign direct invest- 
ment (FDI) because FDI appears less prone to sudden swings than other 
forms of capital inflow. However, negative sentiment about foreign invest- 
ment still exist, reflecting fears of foreign control over the domestic econ- 
omy. In fact, the Korean government as well as the general public was in 
favor of indigenous industrialization rather than FDI-based development. 
Now we need to investigate the role of FDI in economic development, 
as the Korean economy suffers a currency crisis. Specifically, with public 
sentiment running against the harsh conditions of the IMF financial ar- 
rangements, it is interesting to see whether FDI can in fact help Korea to 
avoid the TMF bailout loans. Multinational firms may help the crisis- 
ridden country to circumvent the IMF financial arrangements by provid- 
ing local subsidiaries and business partners normal access to raw materials 
or trade financing. 
As a longer term issue, we need to examine whether FDI enhances effi- 
ciency and thus contributes to sustainable growth. Despite the low realiza- 
tion of FDI, case study evidence shows that foreign firms helped to de- 
velop such strategic industries as semiconductors and to raise productivity 
through the transfer of technology and managerial know-how. 
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This paper investigates these two issues regarding the role of FDI in 
Korea’s economic development. First, we examine whether the quantita- 
tive data supports anecdotal evidence of the productivity spillover effects 
of FDI in Korean manufacturing. Further, we investigate the role of FDI in 
a currency crisis by looking at the relation between the relative importance 
of FDI and the incidence of IMF bailout loans in developing countries. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 9.2 reviews the evolution of 
the Korean government’s FDI policy. Section 9.3 presents the trends and 
patterns of FDI inflow into Korea. Section 9.4 estimates the effects of 
FDI on the productivity of Korean manufacturing industries. Section 9.5 
investigates whether FDI can play a role in preventing IMF rescue loans 
using data for ninety developing countries. Concluding remarks are made 
in section 9.6. 
9.2 Historical Overview of Foreign Direct Investment Policy in Korea 
In order to investigate the role of FDI in Korea’s economic develop- 
ment, it is helpful to review the government’s policy on FDI. Korea is 
well known around the world as an “outward-oriented” country. Yet, as 
demonstrated below, the main orientation of Korea’s investment policies 
has failed to embrace an open market strategy throughout its develop- 
ment stage s. 
9.2.1 Institutionalization, 1960-83 
Following the import substitution drive of the 195Os, Korea shifted its 
development strategy toward a more outward-oriented system that 
emphasized export promotion. The new export-led growth strategy went 
hand in hand with policies aimed at introducing FDI. In 1960, the Korean 
government enacted the Foreign Capital Inducement Act (FCIA) and re- 
lated decrees. 
The government wanted to use FDI to ease balance-of-payments 
difficulties and as a supply of needed technology and expertise. FDI was 
welcomed into the light manufacturing export sector, especially in the two 
Free Export Zones at Masan and Iri. However, foreign investment contin- 
ued to be discouraged in those sectors still protected by import substitu- 
tion measures because the Korean government feared that otherwise the 
economy would become dominated by foreign firms. Moreover, the Ko- 
rean government wanted to channel the limited amount of capital re- 
sources to industries vital to long-term economic growth. With this strat- 
egy in mind, the Korean government preferred foreign borrowing, which 
brought foreign resources under its control. 
9.2.2 Liberalization of Foreign Direct Investment, 1984-97 
A major change occurred in the early 1980s as the Korean economy 
began to experience serious difficulties due to the negative effects of the 
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Heavy and Chemical Industry Promotion Plan of the 1970s. A new indus- 
trial strategy was thus adopted in the early 1980s in an attempt to upgrade 
Korea’s industrial structure into one embracing more technology- and 
skill-intensive sectors. A key component of this technological upgrade was 
the liberalization of FDI. 
In 1984, the Korean government replaced the positive list system with 
a negative list system in which all industries not listed were open for FDI 
approval. 
In December 1989, various performance requirements imposed on for- 
eign-invested enterprises, such as export, local content, and technology 
transfer requirements, were abolished. 
Starting in 1994, the Korean government liberalized restricted business 
categories according to the Five-Year Foreign Investment Liberalization 
Plan, which has been updated every year thereafter. Multilateral trade ne- 
gotiations such as GATT and the government’s aim to induce more com- 
petition in the domestic market fostered a gradual opening of the service 
sector. 
In December 1996, when Korea joined the OECD, the Korean govern- 
ment furthered liberalization by amending the FCIA to create the Act 
on Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Capital Inducement. Its main 
purpose was to bring Korea’s FDI system in line with international norms 
and standards. For example, the concept of FDI was expanded to encom- 
pass long-term (five year or more) loans. Also, starting in February 1997, 
foreign investors were allowed to acquire outstanding shares of Korean 
companies through friendly mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Such 
friendly M&As required the consent of the board of directors of the tar- 
geted company. 
Even though the Korean government made some real efforts to liberal- 
ize FDI, its overall stance toward FDI was passive. The government al- 
lowed FDI into liberalized business categories and activities but refused 
to remove various impediments and to promote FDI to the extent carried 
out in the Southeast Asian countries. 
9.2.3 
At the end of 1997, Korea was throttled by a currency crisis when the 
won depreciated over 100 percent against the U.S. dollar. Loss of foreign 
reserves and the reluctance of foreign lenders to roll over loans brought 
Korea to the brink of default in late December 1997. To overcome the 
crisis in the most rapid and painless way possible, the Korean government 
is targeting more active promotion of FDI. 
In November 1998, the Korean government enacted the Foreign Invest- 
ment Promotion Act. This new legislation focuses on creating an investor- 
oriented policy environment by streamlining foreign investment proce- 
dures, expanding investment incentives, and establishing an institutional 
framework for investor relations, including one-stop service. The Korean 
Promotion after Currency Crisis, 1998 and Afterward 
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government also undertook full-fledged liberalization in the area of hostile 
cross-border M&As and foreign land ownership. 
9.3 Trends of Foreign Direct Investment in Korea 
FDI in Korea was minimal during the initial liberalization that lasted 
from the 1960s until the mid-1980s (table 9.1). In the 1980s, however, an- 
nual average FDI in Korea increased from US$lOO million to over $800 
million. Following a contraction that lasted until 1993, FDI resumed an 
upward trend, reaching $3 billion in 1997 and a record $5.1 billion in 
1998. This growth is in part explained by the fall in stock market and real 
estate prices and the depreciation of the won. It also reflects the Korean 
government’s new policy measures to promote FDI and progress in re- 
structuring the financial and corporate sectors. 
For the sectoral distribution of FDI inflow into Korea, the manufactur- 
ing sector was the largest recipient during the early liberalization period, 
absorbing 67.4 percent of total inward FDI during 1962-86 (table 9.2). 
This trend continued until 1993, when the share of the manufacturing sec- 
tor exceeded 65 percent of total FDI inflow. The share of manufacturing 
as a percentage of total FDI has remained at approximately 55 percent 
since 1996. 
In the manufacturing sector, the composition of inward FDI changed 
toward more investment in the heavy and chemical industries. Since the 
mid-l980s, FDI in labor-intensive and low-technology industries, such as 
textiles and clothing, has fallen significantly because of the rise in labor 
costs. Instead, the electrical and electronics sector and transport equip- 
Table 9.1 Trends of FDI in Korea, 1962-98 (million US. dollars) 
Year Notified Actual 
1962-8 1 
1982-86 
1987-88 
1989 
1990 
1991 
lY92 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1,886.1 
1,767.7 
2,347.1 
1,090.3 
802.6 
1,396.0 
894.5 
1,044.3 
1,316.5 
1,941.4 
3,202.6 
6,970.9 
8.852.4 
1,477.8 
1,157.8 
I ,5 19.7 
812.3 
895.4 
1,177.2 
803.3 
728.1 
991.5 
1,357.1 
2,308.3 
3,085.9 
5,155.6 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy, Trends in International Investment and Technology 
Inducement (Seoul, 1999). 
Table 9.2 Share of Selected Manufacturing Industries in Total PDI, 1962-98 (percent) 
Industry 1962-86 1987-90 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Cumulated 
Manufacturing 
Food 
Chemicals 
Medicine 
Petroleum 
Machinery 
Electrical and electronics 
Transport equipment 
Other manufacturing 
67.4 
3.4 
14.2 
2.8 
3.3 
4.2 
14.7 
11.2 
9.9 
63.3 80.0 75.3 67.6 35.4 43.2 56.2 59.4 54.9 
4.5 1.3 13.5 2.0 0.5 1.1 1.8 15.0 12.2 
12.4 15.5 28.5 33.7 11.0 10.0 10.1 8.3 8.3 
3.6 4.8 3.8 1.8 3.2 2.9 1.1 1.3 2.3 
1.5 33.5 0.2 2.8 0.5 3.3 9.3 0.1 0.0 
7.7 9.5 5.9 3.3 7.0 6.5 5.9 3.1 10.4 
17.9 9.1 7.1 3.6 3.7 10.2 12.2 7.1 4.5 
10.1 2.0 4.2 11.5 3.1 3.4 10.8 11.6 3.0 
4.5 4.2 9.2 8.6 5.5 5.2 4.4 12.6 0.6 
59.4 
7.1 
12.1 
2.5 
3.8 
6.8 
9.6 
7.5 
0.8 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy, Trends in Internutional Investment and Technology Inducement (Seoul, 1999). 
Note: Based on actual investments. For 1962-86 and 1987-90, figures are annual averages. 
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ment and chemicals are receiving increased amounts of foreign invest- 
ment. Since 1997, foreign food companies increased their investment in 
Korea by acquiring domestic food companies and their distribution net- 
works. 
The composition of FDI in the service sector has also changed. The 
hotel business used to be the largest subsector in terms of cumulated FDI 
up to the early 1990s. Since the mid-I990s, FDI in wholesale and retail 
trade as well as financing and insurance increased remarkably (table 9.3). 
Since 1998, after the outbreak of the currency crisis, a number of do- 
mestic firms have been sold in order to alleviate debt burdens, as shown 
in table 9.4. Since the M&A market is not well developed in Korea, there 
are still wide gaps between the prices at which domestic firms are offered 
and the prices foreigners are willing to pay. Delay in the sale of such assets 
can also be attributed to the high debt ratios and lack of transparency of 
domestic firms, as well as the lack of improvement in labor market condi- 
tions. 
9.4 Effect of Foreign Direct Investment in Korea on Productivity 
Despite the small amount of FDI in Korea relative to the size of its 
economy, it was foreign firms that brought the key technology and con- 
structed the basis for such industries as electronics and pharmaceuticals. 
For example, subsidiaries of foreign semiconductor firms contributed to 
the growth of domestic firms into major players in the world market by 
spinning out skilled workers and managers as well as through technical 
guidance to subcontractors. Also, multinational pharmaceutical firms 
helped the domestic pharmaceutical industry to develop new drugs by 
boosting local research capabilities.' More specifically, anecdotal evidence 
shows that foreign-invested firms may raise productivity by spinning out 
skilled workers, providing technical guidance to subcontractors, bringing 
in new capital goods and technology, introducing advanced management 
know-how, conducting in-house R&D, and enhancing competition.2 
The purpose of this section is to examine whether the quantitative data 
support the qualitative case study evidence for productivity spillovers in 
Korea. Previous empirical studies of this issue present mixed evidence on 
productivity spillovers from foreign investment. Studies using sector-level 
data tend to show positive evidence for productivity spillovers from for- 
eign presence (ownership) or level of FDI (Caves 1974; Globerman 1979; 
Blomstrom and Persson 1983; Choi and Hyun 1991; Hong 1997; Chan, 
1. A more detailed description of the impact of foreign-invested firms on the development 
of the Korean semiconductor and pharmaceutical industries is given in Kim (1997). 
2. Blomstrom and Kokko (1996) presented an overview of empirical studies on productiv- 
ity spillovers by classifying them into backward and forward linkages, training of local em- 
ployees, and demonstration and competition effects. 
Table 9.3 Share of Selected Service Industries in Total FDI, 1962-98 (percent) 
Industry 1962-86 1987-90 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Cumulated 
Service 
Wholesale and retail 
Trading 
Hotel 
Transport and storage 
Financing 
Insurance 
Construction 
Restaurant 
Other service 
31.9 
0.6 
0.0 
18.7 
1.2 
7.1 
0.1 
1.6 
0.0 
2.5 
36.3 
0.1 
1.7 
20.7 
0.2 
9.5 
2.4 
0.3 
0.1 
1.2 
20.0 24.4 32.4 64.6 56.8 43.8 39.0 41.5 
0.4 1.4 0.7 2.5 4.3 14.3 8.3 10.1 
4.5 6.8 11.6 9.5 8.0 4.8 6.3 4.7 
3.1 1.1 7.1 20.8 4.3 5.0 3.1 0.0 
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 5.2 1 .o 0.1 
6.2 5.7 4.5 20.5 26.3 7.7 9.8 9.1 
3.7 5.4 1.2 0.8 4.0 0.7 0.2 1.4 
0.2 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.9 1.4 1.6 0.1 
0.3 1.3 4.7 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 
1.6 2.5 2.4 9.0 8.3 4.5 8.5 15.8 
39.3 
5.7 
4.7 
8.1 
0.9 
10.0 
1.6 
0.7 
0.4 
7.1 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy, Trends in International Investment and Technology Inducement (Seoul, 1999). 
Note: Based on actual investment. For 1962-86 and 1987-90, figures are annual averages. 
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Table 9.4 Major Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions since the Currency 
Crisis in Korea (1998) 
Korean Firm Foreign Buyer Contents 
Hanwha 
Hanwha 
Hyosung 
Daesang 
Halla 
Shinho Paper Co. 
Sambo Computer 
Korea Exchange Bank 
Korea Makro 
Samsung Heavy 
Industries 
Anam Semiconductor 
Samsung Electronics 
FAG OEM and Handel 
BASF (Germany) 
(Germany) 
BASF (Germany) 
BASF (Germany) 
Bowater (USA) 
Norske Skog (Norway) 
Seiko Epson (Japan) 
Commerz Bank 
(Germany) 
Wal-Mart (USA) 
Volvo (Sweden) 
AT1 (USA) 
Fairchild (USA) 
Sold bearing unit for 320 billion 
won (US213 million)a 
Sold 50% stake in Hanwha 
BASF Urethane for 120 
billion won ($80 million)' 
Sold 50% stake in Hyosung 
BASF for 64 billion won ($43 
mil l i~n )~  
Sold Lysine unit for $600 million 
Sold Halla Pulp and Paper for 
Sold for $175 million 
Sold printer unit for $20 million 
Sold 29.8% stake for $276 
million 
Sold Makro's subsidiary for $181 
million 
Sold construction equipment 
division for $750 million 
Sold semiconductor 
manufacturing factory for 
$600 million 
manufacturing factory for 
$455 million 
$210 million 
Sold semiconductor 
aExchange rate of 1,500 won per dollar i s  applied. 
chap. 12 in this ~o lume) .~  However, studies using firm-level data find that 
FDI has a statistically insignificant impact on total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth (Haddad and Harrison 1993; Aitken and Harrison 1994; 
Djankov and Hoekman 1998).4 
One reason for these differing results is that most studies using sector- 
level data did not cure the identification problem: if foreign investment 
tends to locate in more productive sectors, estimates of the impact of FDI 
on the productivity of domestic industries are biased upward (Aitken and 
Harrison 1994; Harrison 1996). 
3. Using a cross-country data set for sixty-nine developing countries, Borensztein, de Gre- 
gorio, and Lee (1998) also found that FDI contributes more to growth than does domestic 
investment when sufficient capability to absorb advanced technologies, measured by human 
capital, is available in the host economy. 
4. One exception is Chung, Mitchell, and Yeung (1994), which found, using firm-level 
panel data on U.S. automobile component manufacturers. that productivity gains among 
host country suppliers largely stem from the increase in competition created by FDI rather 
than from direct technology transfer. 
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Given the absence of appropriate firm-level data in Korea, we resort to 
industry aggregate data in six manufacturing subsectors; food, textiles and 
clothing, chemicals and petroleum, metals, machinery, and electrical and 
 electronic^.^ This paper differs from previous studies using sector-level 
data by taking the endogeneity problem into consideration, estimating a 
random-effects model with instruments. 
9.4.1 Empirical Framework 
Constrained by the insufficient number of observations, we take the 
growth accounting approach for calculating TFP in each subsector. Al- 
though the growth accounting approach is subject to criticism, it can avoid 
such econometric problems as limited degrees of freedom that are ex- 
pected to occur if the production function approach is used (Collins and 
Bosworth 1996, 139).6 
The conventional growth accounting framework shows that the growth 
rate of value added in sector i can be decomposed into the contribution of 
increases in factor inputs plus a residual. That is, it assumes the underlying 
relation between output (Q) and the inputs capital ( K ) ,  labor (L), and 
technology or TFP ( A )  as follows: 
(1) Q, = F ( K , ,  L , , A L ) ,  i = 1 ,..., n .  
Equation (1) yields an index of growth in TFP, denoted by u,, which can 
be defined as the growth rate of output, q,, less the share-weighted growth 
of the factor inputs, k, and 1,:’ 
(2) U ,  = 4, - a,k, - aL1,. 
We use the Tornqvist approximation of the Divisia index for factor shares, 
which is the arithmetic average of the current and previous period’s fac- 
tor shares.* 
For the impact of FDI on productivity, we use the following specifi- 
cation: 
(3) a,( = Po + P,fdi.,-, + P*rOY,,,-l + E , , ,  
where fdi represents the growth rate of the FDI stock and roy stands for 
the growth rate of the royalty stock, which is used as a proxy for imported 
technology from foreign countries. Unlike the FDI stock, royalties paid 
5. These are at the two-digit level. 
6. Hong and Kim (1996) showed that estimates of TFP growth obtained by the growth 
accounting approach are similar to estimates obtained by the translog production function 
approach in Korean manufacturing industries during 1967-93. 
7. Any deviations from constant returns to scale and unmeasured human capital are allo- 
cated to this residual of TFP (Lee 1995; Collins and Bosworth 1996). 
8. Lee and Zang (1998) also used the Divisia-Tornqvist index for calculating regional pro- 
ductivity in Korea. 
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for imported technology may have offsetting effects on productivity. In 
other words, it may raise productivity through technology transfer or 
lower productivity by reducing the incentive to conduct R&D. We assume 
that it takes one year for foreign-invested firms to start operating after 
investment and also that technology imports affect productivity with a 
one-year lag. Hence, the explanatory variables fdi and roy are lagged one 
year to adjust for a time delay.9 
9.4.2 Data 
Annual data on real output (value added) and employment in the manu- 
facturing industries were taken from the Report on Mining and Manufac- 
turing Survey, published by the National Statistical Office, which contains 
very detailed microlevel industry data. The number of employees was 
multiplied by average man-hours to yield data on labor input. For real net 
capital input, we used industry-specific real net capital stock data calcu- 
lated by Pyo (1997), who employed the polynomial benchmark estimation 
method.1° We adjusted this net capital stock by operation ratio indexes 
from the Korea Statistical Yearbook, published by the National Statisti- 
cal Office.’l 
For the real value of the FDI and royalty stocks, we used the data of 
Choi and Hyun (1991) for 1974-89, with the exception that we adjusted 
for 1990 constant gross fixed capital formation prices. For 1990-96, we 
updated these FDI and royalty stocks, by adding the new inflow of FDI 
and royalties to the depreciation-adjusted stocks. I *  
9.4.3 Estimation Results 
Because of the possible endogeneity between productivity effects and 
the independent variables, estimating equation (3) by ordinary least 
squares (OLS) may give biased and inconsistent estimates. To deal with 
the possible endogeneity that FDI flows into the manufacturing subsectors 
with high productivity, we estimate a random-effects model. The random- 
effects model has an advantage over the fixed-effects estimation in that it 
avoids the imposition of constant productivity growth over time. To cor- 
rect for the remaining endogeneity problem, we also estimate the random- 
effects model using in~truments.’~ 
9. Taking lags for the independent variables may also reduce the possible endogeneity. 
10. Using net capital stock data (Nk) from the National Wealth Surveys for 1968, 1977, 
and 1987 and fixed capital formation data ( I )  in the polynomial benchmark-year equation, 
he estimated economic depreciation rates to calculate the real net capital stock for each year. 
11. Basu (1995) found that cyclical factor utilization is very important for explaining pro- 
cyclical productivity. 
12. The assumed depreciation rates taken from Choi and Hyun (1991) are 12 percent for 
FDI and 15 percent for royalties. 
13. Specifically, fitted values of the independent variables using instruments are inserted 
in the estimation of a random-effects model. 
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Table 9.5 Regression Estimates of Productivity Effects of FDI in Korean 
Manufacturing, 1974-96 
Random Effects 
Variable OLS Random Effects with Instruments' 
Constant 0.049 
fdi,,,-I 0.037 
roY,.,-l -0.054 
(3.413) 
(1.145) 
(- 0.948) 
N 138 
LM testb 
Hausman test' 
R2 0.014 
0.050 
(3.123) 
0.037 
(1.123) 
-0.058 
(-0.980) 
138 
1.32 
[0.25] 
0.29 
[0.86] 
0.014 
0.066 
(3.106) 
0.026 
(0.172) 
-0.138 
(- 1.142) 
138 
1.20 
[0.27] 
0.71 
[0.70] 
0.014 
Note: Equation is a,, = 0, + p, fdi,,,-, +,P2 ray,,,-, + E,,. Numbers in parentheses are t- 
statistics. Numbers in brackets are probability values of x 2  tests. 
"fdi,,,-,, fdi,,,-,, royi,,-2, and ray,,_, are used as instruments. 
bHigh values of the LM test favor a one-factor model over a classical regression model with 
no group specific effects. 
'Low values of the Hausman test favor a random-effects model. 
Table 9.5 reports the results of OLS and random-effects estimations 
with and without  instrument^.'^ For both the OLS and the random-effects 
models, the coefficient on the growth rate of FDI stock is positive but 
statistically in~ignificant.'~ Unlike the case study evidence, the industry 
aggregate data do not show that FDT has a positive effect on productivity. 
This might be due to aggregation of data at the sector level in that the 
experiences of individual firms are not sufficient to have an impact at the 
aggregate level. We expect a different result from a firm-level analysis, 
which we leave for future research. 
The growth rate of the royalty stock has a negative but statistically insig- 
nificant effect for both the OLS model and the random-effects model with 
and without instruments. One possible explanation for the insignificant 
effect of royalties on productivity is that the negative effect of the importa- 
tion of technology by reducing incentives to conduct in-house R&D may 
offset its positive effect on productivity through technology transfer. 
14. We could not gain much using the random-effects model, as shown by the LM test 
results. This may be because growth rates of productivity across sectors do not differ much. 
The mean and variance of growth rates of productivity for each sector fall in the ranges 
-0.005 to 0.004 and 0.013 to 0.044, respectively. 
15. The coefficient and t-ratio are smaller when the random-effects model is estimated 
using instruments. 
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9.5 The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in a Currency Crisis: 
Is It a Safety Net? 
In 1997, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Korea were hit by currency 
crises. There is a wide range of literature on the nature of the Asian crisis 
(Krugman 1998; Sachs 1997a; Fischer 1998; Frankel 1998).16 According 
to this literature, the causes of the Asian crisis can be broadly summarized 
as two general factors: one is the moral hazard of domestic financial inter- 
mediaries, and the other is the bank run by foreign investors. From the 
midst of the crisis, we explain the causes as a combination of these two 
explanations-underlying structural problems and an abrupt loss of inves- 
tor confidence. 
In fact, the moral hazard of financial intermediaries whose liabilities 
were perceived as having an implicit government guarantee created bub- 
bles in asset prices.17 Asian-style corporate governance, which emphasizes 
growth rather than profitability, as well as the closed and underdeveloped 
domestic banking system, which lacks appropriate risk management, also 
contributed to these bubbles by allowing overinvestment. 
The bursting of the bubbles touched off a downward spiral in which 
falling asset prices exposed the insolvency of intermediaries, forcing them 
to cease operations, leading to further asset deflation (Krugman 1998). 
The bank run or financial panic aggravated this vicious circle as foreign 
investors liquidated their investments early, thus making the crisis even 
more severe. 
Frankel and Rose (1996) and Park and Lee (1998) showed that a low 
level of net FDI-that is, FDI inflow subtracted from FDI outflow-cor- 
relates closely with the incidence of currency crisis. 
One argument in favor of FDI is that of stability. In the event of a crash, 
investors can suddenly dump securities and banks can refuse to roll over 
loans, but multinational corporations cannot quickly pack up their factor- 
ies and go home (Frankel and Rose 1996, 355). In addition, the mere po- 
tential of FDI may act as a stabilizer against the risk of financial panic 
because the presence of potential foreign buyers would provide sufficient 
liquidity to make a liquidity crisis impossible (Krugman 2000). 
Related to this argument, one can argue that even in a currency crisis, 
countries (such as Malaysia) where multinational firms have a dominant 
presence in the domestic economy may endure or overcome the crisis with- 
16. The Asian currency crises were born in an environment marked by the globalization 
of financial and capital markets and the movement of massive capital flows across national 
borders. Thus they have distinct characteristics from the other currency crises in the past. 
See NBER (1998) for details. 
17. The implicit government guarantee can be attributed to directed lending or connected 
lending, characteristic of “crony capitalism.” 
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out being forced to resort to IMF bailout loans.'8 Thanks to their parent 
firms, subsidiaries of multinational firms in crisis-ridden countries do not 
suffer lowered credit ratings or such difficulties in importing raw materials 
or in trade financing as do other domestic firms. 
The following subsections examine this last hypothesis, that FDI is as- 
sociated with IMF rescue loans, by using cross-sectional data from 1994 
to 1997 and pooled data from 1973 to 1994 for developing countries. San- 
taella (1 995) provided a complementary work that analyzes the macroeco- 
nomic conditions surrounding IMF financial arrangements in developing 
countries but did not study the relation between IMF arrangements and 
FDI. For an empirical analysis, we adopt the probit estimation of Frankel 
and Rose (1996), which is a nonstructural exploration of the data. 
9.5.1 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Currency Crashes 
and IMF Rescue Loans, 1994-97 
We first use cross-sectional data on ninety developing countries to inves- 
tigate whether countries experiencing currency crashes or IMF rescue 
loans during the period 1994-97 have lower levels of FDI than other coun- 
tries.I9 
Variables and Datu 
As the dependent variable, we construct a binary variable, b9497, which 
takes a dichotomous value of one if the country received a bailout loan 
from the IMF during 1994-97 and zero otherwise. IMF Stand-By and Ex- 
tended Fund Facility (EFF) Arrangements were used to proxy rescue loans, 
Stand-By Arrangements can be considered emergency loans for balance- 
of-payments support, and the EFF is intended to allow member countries 
18. IMF bailout loans usually accompany painful macroeconomic adjustment. Sachs 
(1997b) criticized the IMF programs addressing the Asian crisis, pointing out that de- 
manding too much austerity in the form of budget cuts and tight credit to countries with high 
savings and budget surpluses may transform a currency crisis into a rip-roaring economic 
downturn. Feldstein (1998) also argued that the IMF should have focused on providing tech- 
nical advice and limited financial assistance as a supportive organization rather than as the 
agent of painful contractions in its dealing with the Asian crisis. 
19. The ninety developing countries are Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, 
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cbte D'Ivoire, Dji- 
bouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, 
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Vincent, Senegal, Seychelles, 
Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thai- 
land, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey. Uganda, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, 
and Zimbabwe. 
280 June-Dong Kim and Sang-In Hwang 
to adopt measures with a medium-term horizon for solving their balance- 
of-payments adjustment problems. 
To compare the relation between FDI and IMF rescue loans with previ- 
ous work on currency crisis, we also use a variable for currency crash, 
e9497, constructed as in Frankel and Rose (1996). The binary variable, 
e9497, takes the value one if the country experienced a nominal currency 
depreciation of at least 25 percent and an increase in the rate of deprecia- 
tion of at least 10 percent during the period 1994-97 and zero otherwise.20 
As independent variables, we use seven of the variables used in Frankel 
and Rose (1996), for which we use 1993 data due to availability.2' As inter- 
nal domestic macroeconomic variables, we use the growth rate of domestic 
credit (Domestic credit), which is a measure of monetary policy, and the 
growth rate of real GDP per capita (Growth rate). As measures of vulner- 
ability to external shocks, we use the ratio of foreign exchange reserves 
to monthly import values (Reservedimports), the current account as a 
percentage of GDP (Current account), and the ratio of total debt to GNP 
(Debt). For the composition of capital inflows and foreign debt, we use 
the ratio of short-term debt to total debt (Short-term debt), the ratio of 
net FDI inflow to total debt (FDI flow/debt), and the ratio of inward FDI 
stock to total debt (FDI stock/debt). 
The variables of interest are FDI flow/debt and FDI stock/debt, denot- 
ing FDI inflow and inward FDI stock, respectively. FDI inflow represents 
the stability of the foreign capital inflow. It also incorporates the foreign 
investors' view of the policy regime or investment environment of the host 
country. Thus it is appropriate to test the first claim about the role of FDI 
in a currency crisis, that is, its role as a stabilizer. Meanwhile, inward FDI 
stock represents the presence of multinational firms in the host country. 
Hence, it is more suited for testing the other hypothesis, on the role of FDI 
in circumventing the need for IMF rescue loans in a crisis-ridden country. 
Probit Estimation Results 
Table 9.6 presents the probit estimation results of the cross-sectional 
analysis for the period 1994-97. For the currency crash case, only the 
coefficient on the growth rate of GDP per capita is significant. Its negative 
sign shows that countries with higher growth rates tend to have lower 
incidences of currency crash. Unlike previous studies, neither FDI flow 
nor FDI stock is associated with currency crash. 
For IMF rescue loans, the coefficients on FDI flow and FDI stock, 
-0.1074 and -0.0209, respectively, are both significantly negative. This 
20. In calculating the depreciation of currency, we use end-of-year exchange rates. The 
estimation results are not seriously affected by using the annual average of exchange rates, 
although the explanatory power in terms of log likelihood gets marginally smaller. 
21. Definitions and data sources for the variables used are presented in appendix table 
9A.3. 
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Table 9.6 Probit Estimation of Currency Crashes and IMF Rescue Loans, 199k97: Cross- 
Sectional Data for 90 Developing Countries 
Dependent Variables 
Currency Crash 
Independent Variable (e9497) 
IMF Rescue Loan 
(b9497) 
~ 
Short-term debt 
Debt 
Growth rate 
Reserves/imports 
Domestic credit 
Current account 
FDI flow/debt 
FDI stock/debt 
N 
Nwith dep. = 1 
N with dep. = 0 
Log likelihood 
0.0039 
(0.38) 
-0.1214 
(-0.64) 
(-2.08) 
-0.0882 
0.01 22 
-0.0005 
(0.21) 
(-0.55) 
(-0.47) 
-0.0076 
0.0186 
(0.64) 
84 
34 
50 
-53.57 
0.0060 
(0.60) 
-0.1085 
(-0.66) 
(-2.23) 
-0.0757 
-0.0090 
(-0.17) 
(-0.55) 
(-0.66) 
-0.0005 
-0.0107 
-0.0017 
(-0.51) 
90 
40 
50 
-57.83 
0.0125 
(1.13) 
- 0.9743 
(-2.31) 
0.0038 
(0.09) 
-0.0081 
-0.0010 
-0.001 1 
-0.1074 
(-0.14) 
(-0.76) 
(-0.06) 
(-2.53) 
84 
29 
55 
-46.34 
0.0197 
(1.61) 
-0.8793 
(-2.56) 
(-0.41) 
(-0.59) 
(-0.30) 
(-0.13) 
-0.0140 
-0.0410 
-0.0015 
-0.0024 
-0.0209 
(-2.69) 
90 
32 
58 
-49.03 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. For independent variables, 1993 data are used. Coefficients 
on the constant are not reported. 
implies that countries with which the IMF made Stand-By and EFF Ar- 
rangements during 1994-97 tend to have lower FDI inflow and stock in 
1993 than other countries. The coefficients on the other variables, except 
for the ratio of total debt to GNP (Debt), are not significant. 
9.5.2 Analysis of Currency Crashes and IMF Rescue Loans 
Using Pooled Data, 1973-94 
The cross-sectional analysis in subsection 9.5.1 has one drawback in 
that the number of total observations is small relative to the number of 
independent variables. In addition, the data in 1993 may not be able to 
sufficiently explain the incidence of currency crashes and IMF rescue 
loans in the four-year period ahead. To overcome this problem, we con- 
duct the same analysis using pooled data for 1973-94 for eighty-four de- 
veloping countries.22 
22. Due to lack of data on IMF financial arrangements, seventeen countries are deleted 
from the list of ninety countries in subsection 9.5.1. They are Belize, Comoros, Djibouti, 
Equatorial Guinea, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Maldives, Oman, Papua New 
Guinea, Portugal, Saint Vincent, SHo Tome, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Zim- 
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Variables and Data 
The data descriptions are the same as in the cross-sectional analysis of 
subsection 9.5.1, except that for the dependent variable, ER, representing 
the event of currency crash, we adopt the three-year “windowing” of Fran- 
kel and Rose ( 1996).23 That is, we exclude crashes that occurred within 
three years of each other to avoid counting the same crash twice. Similarly, 
for the other dependent variable, IMF, denoting the incidence of IMF 
Stand-By and EFF Arrangements, we exclude arrangements that were 
made in consecutive years to avoid double counting.24 Among the inde- 
pendent variables, the ratio of inward FDI stock to total debt is deleted 
due to the absence of relevant data in the full sample period. 
Probit Estimation Results 
Table 9.7 reports the probit estimation results using pooled data for 
eighty-four countries during the twenty-two years from 1973 to 1994.25 
“Lagged t” means that the independent variables are those in the current 
year. In the “Lagged t-1” column, we tabulate the results in which all 
regressors are lagged one year to adjust for time lag in the relation between 
currency crashes or IMF rescue loans and macroeconomic conditions. 
The estimated coefficient on our variable of interest, FDI flow/debt, is 
significantly negative in all cases, implying that FDI inflow relative to total 
debt is negatively associated with currency crashes and IMF rescue ar- 
rangements in both the current and lead periods. 
For currency crashes, the coefficients on the other variables are similar 
to the results of Frankel and Rose (1996). Lower growth rates, higher 
growth of domestic credit, and higher portions of short-term debt all seem 
to raise the odds of a currency crash in the following year. 
We saw roughly similar results for IMF rescue arrangements, except 
that the growth rate of domestic credit is not significantly associated with 
IMF arrangements and the coefficient on foreign reserves (Reservedim- 
ports) is now significant. This is because the growth rate of domestic credit 
raises the inflation rate and hence has a direct effect on exchange rates or 
currency crashes. Meanwhile, a low level of foreign reserves relative to 
monthly imports indicates a country’s inability to deal with a balance-of- 
payments problem without asking for rescue loans from the IMF. Other- 
wise, the results imply that the macroeconomic conditions behind cur- 
babwe. Eleven countries are then addcd: Burundi, Lebanon, Liberia, Myanmar, Somalia, 
Tanzania, Western Samoa, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Zambia. 
23. Here the annual average of the nominal exchange rate is used in calculating the depreci- 
ation rate. 
24. For the case of arrangements made in more than three consecutive years, we count 
the first two years to take into account a delay or adjustment period in improving eco- 
nomic conditions. 
25. For currency crash (ER), we reproduced the estimation results by Park and Lce (1998). 
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Table 9.7 Probit Estimation of Currency Crashes and IMF Rescue Loans, 1 9 7 S 9 4  Pooled 
Data for 84 Developing Countries 
Dependent Variables 
Currency Crash (ER) IMF Rescue Loan (IMF) 
Independent Variable 
Short-term debt 
Debt 
Growth rate 
Reserves/imports 
Government budget 
Domestic credit 
Current account 
FDI flow/debt 
N 
N with dep. = 1 
N with dep. = 0 
Log likelihood 
Lagged t Lagged t - 1 
0.0030 0.0101 
(0.61) (2.22) 
0.5076 0.0594 
(3.96) (0.46) 
-0.0525 -0.0363 
(-4.96) (-3.78) 
(-0.40) (- 1.73) 
(1.13) (- 1.74) 
-0.0087 -0.0377 
0.0122 -0.0164 
0.0024 0.0005 
(4.99) (3.09) 
0.0241 0.01 19 
(3.07) (1.69) 
-0.0345 -0.0329 
(-3.43) (-3.41) 
1,080 1,111 
116 128 
964 983 
-306.27 -361.87 
Lagged t 
-0.0022 
0.3363 
(3.24) 
(-2.00) 
(-2.13) 
(-0.04) 
(- 0.44) 
-0.0196 
-0.0525 
-0.0004 
0.0001 
(0.17) 
0.01 79 
(2.35) 
-0.0378 
(-3.51) 
964 
130 
834 
-354.56 
Lagged t - 1 
0.0069 
(1.43) 
0.0981 
(0.92) 
-0.0327 
(-3.41) 
(-3.03) 
(- 3.00) 
(-0.75) 
-0.0786 
-0.0277 
-0.0003 
0.0018 
(0.26) 
-0.0268 
(-2.58) 
996 
138 
858 
-364.94 
Note; Numbers in parentheses are t-values. Coefficients on the constant are not reported. 
Table 9.8 Probabilities of Currency Crashes and IMF Arrangements in Selected Countries, 
1997 
Korea Indonesia Thailand Malaysia Philippines Mexicod 
Currency 
IMF rescue 
crashes (ER) 0.195 0.065 0.093 0.064 0.100 0.119 
loan (IMF) 0.168 0.050 0.071 0.065 0.097 0.119 
Note; Based on estimated coefficients in “Lagged t - 1” columns of table 9.7 applied to the values of 
independent variables in appendix table 9A.8. 
“For Mexico, probabilities are for the year 1994. 
rency crashes and IMF rescue loans are similar. In particular, FDI inflow 
seems to lower the odds of both currency crashes and IMF rescue loans. 
Using the estimated coefficients in the “Lagged t - 1” columns of table 
9.7 and values of independent variables for 1996 (1993 for Mexico), we 
calculate in table 9.8 the predicted probabilities of currency crises and 
IMF arrangements in some crisis-ridden countries for 1997 (1994 for Mex- 
ico). According to the predictions, the probabilities of currency crisis and 
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IMF arrangements in Korea are the highest among the five crisis-ridden 
Asian countries. Furthermore, they are higher than the corresponding 
probabilities for Mexico for 1994. Appendix table 9A.8, which presents 
values for precrash macroeconomic variables, reveals that the high pre- 
dicted probabilities of currency crisis and IMF arrangements for Korea 
can be attributed to the country’s relatively high proportion of short-term 
debt and low ratio of FDI flow to total debt. 
Meanwhile, the predicted probabilities for Indonesia are the lowest 
among these crisis-ridden countries, including Mexico. Indonesia, how- 
ever, suffered a crisis no less severe than the other countries, so the above 
probit model may have failed to capture some political factors. 
9.6 Concluding Remarks 
Throughout Korea’s economic development, FDI has played a negli- 
gible role. Even in 1996, FDI accounted for less than 1 percent of total 
domestic fixed capital formation in Korea, far less than in the Southeast 
Asian countries. Case study evidence shows, however, that despite its 
quantitative insignificance FDI has had a significant impact on the quality 
of Korean economic development by spinning out skilled workers and 
managers and through technical guidance of subcontractors. 
However, industry aggregate data for six Korean manufacturing subsec- 
tors during 1974-96 fail to support the case study evidence. Estimation 
of a random-effects model using instruments shows that the productivity 
spillover effects of FDI are positive but statistically insignificant. We leave 
the analysis using firm-level data for future research. 
Concerning the role of FDI in a currency crisis, the presence of multina- 
tional firms may help a crash-ridden country to overcome its crisis without 
resorting to bailout loans from the IMF. Probit estimation results using 
cross-sectional data reveal that inward FDI, in both flow and stock, in 
1993 was negatively associated with the incidence of IMF Stand-By and 
EFF Arrangements during 1994-97. Probit analysis using pooled data for 
eighty-four developing countries during the twenty-two years from 1973 
to 1994 also shows that FDI inflow tends to lower the odds of currency 
crash and IMF rescue loans. 
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Appendix 
Table 9A.l Summary Statistics for Variables in Table 9.5 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
a<* 0.042 0.116 
fdi,,,-, 0.069 0.310 
ray,,-, 0.188 0.178 
Table 9A.2 Correlation Matrix for Variables in Table 9.5 
1’ 0 8 ,  1 .oo 
2. fdiL,,-, 0.09 1 .oo 
3. ‘0Yr.t I -0.07 0.16 1 .oo 
Table 9A.3 Definitions and Data Sources for Variables in Section 9.5 
Variable Definition Source 
IMF (b9497) 
ER (e9497) 
One if a country received IMF Stand-By or EFF 
One if a country suffered a depreciation by more 
1 2  
3 
Arrangements (in 1994-97), zero otherwise 
than 25% in a year and an increase in the rate of 
depreciation of at least 10% (during 1994-97), 
zero otherwise 
Short-term debt Ratio of short-term debt to total debt (YO) 4 
Debt Ratio of total debt to GNP 4 
Growth rate Growth rate of GDP per capita (“h) 4 
Reserveslimports Ratio of foreign reserves to monthly imports (months) 4 
Government Ratio of government budget surplus to GDP (“h) 4 
Domestic credit Growth rate of domestic credit (“h) 4 
Current account Ratio of current account surplus to GDP (YO) 
FDI flow/debt Ratio of net FDI inflow to total debt (“h) 
FDI stock/debt Ratio of FDI stock to total debt (“’0) 
Sources: (1) Santaella (1995). (2) International Monetary Fund, Annual Report (Washington, 
D.C., various years). (3) International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook (Washington, D.C., various years). (4) World Bank, World Data (Washington, 
D.C., 1995), CD-ROM. (5) United Nations, World Investment Report (New York, 1995). 
budget 
4 
4 
5 
Table 9A.4 Summary Statistics for Variables in Table 9.6 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
b9497 
e9497 
Short-term debt 
Debt 
Growth rate 
Reserveslimports 
Domestic credit 
Current account 
FDI flow/debt 
FDI stock/debt 
0.35 
0.41 
15.07 
0.80 
1.10 
3.57 
51.15 
-9.40 
4.05 
17.08 
0.48 
0.49 
14.25 
0.92 
4.14 
2.75 
292.08 
10.49 
5.63 
18.82 
Table 9A.5 Correlation Matrix for Variables in Table 9.6 
1. b9497 
2. e9497 
3. Short-term debt 
4. Debt 
5. Growth rate 
6. Reserveslimports 
7. Domestic credit 
8. Current account 
9. FDI flowldebt 
10. FDI stockldebt 
1 .oo 
0.26 1.00 
0.06 -0.00 
-0.17 0.00 
-0.09 -0.23 
0.05 0.00 
-0.07 -0.08 
0.08 -0.10 
-0.21 -0.02 
-0.21 -0.06 
1 .oo 
-0.02 1.00 
0.15 -0.19 1 .oo 
-0.01 -0.28 0.04 
0.05 -0.08 0.08 
0.09 -0.50 0.23 
0.22 0.23 0.43 
0.30 -0.05 0.15 - 
1 .oo 
0.19 1 .oo 
0.32 0.12 1 .oo 
0.02 -0.06 0.03 1 .oo 
-0.11 -0.06 -0.10 0.64 1 .oo 
Table 9A.6 Summary Statistics for Variables in Table 9.7: Current Values 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
ER 
IMF 
Short-term debt 
Debt 
Growth rate 
Reserveslimports 
Government budget 
Domestic credit 
Current account 
FDI flowldebt 
0.12 
0.13 
14.60 
0.54 
1.61 
3.41 
-4.32 
47.93 
-6.79 
4.03 
0.32 
0.34 
1 1.94 
0.42 
5.75 
3.1 1 
5.83 
228.25 
8.53 
9.44 
Table 9A.7 Correlation Matrix for Variables in Table 9.7: Current Values 
1. ER 
2. IMF 
3. Short-term debt 
4. Debt 
5. Growth rate 
6. Reserveslimports 
7. Government budget 
8. Domestic credit 
9. Current account 
10. FDI flow/debt 
I .oo 
0.20 
0.04 
0.14 
-0.21 
-0.03 
-0.03 
0.22 
0.06 
-0.11 
1 .oo 
-0.01 
0.18 
-0.12 
-0.10 
-0.05 
-0.01 
-0.00 
-0.13 
1 .oo 
0.02 -0.21 1 .oo 
0.18 -0.29 0.17 1 .oo 
0.04 -0.26 0.14 0.37 1 .oo 
0.04 -0.02 -0.08 0.02 -0.02 
0.19 -0.29 0.09 0.38 0.30 
-0.06 1 .oo 
-0.06 -0.26 0.19 0.27 0.21 - 
1 .oo 
0.03 1 .oo 
-0.00 0.08 1 .oo 
Table 9A.8 Values of Macroeconomic Variables for Calculating Probabilities in Table 9.8 
Variable Korea Indonesia Thailand Malaysia Philippines Mexicoa 
Short-term debt (%) 
Debt/GNP 
Growth rate (YO) 
Reserveslimports (months) 
Government budget (YO) 
FDI flow/debtb (YO) 
Domestic credit (%I) 
Current account (YO) 
58.9 
0.26 
5.9 
2.65 
-1.1 
- 1.36 
19.3 
-4.7 
24.8 
0.534 
6.1 
6.73 
0 
3.24 
22.1 
-4 
40.8 
0.504 
5.2 
6.27 
1.5 
1.26 
14.03 
-8.5 
41 
0.392 
5.3 
4.09 
-0.5 
11.13 
12 
-1.4 
26.6 
0.649 
5 
3.52 
-0.1 
1.99 
40.2 
-4.4 
23.1 
0.332 
-2.1 
4.1 
-1.7 
4.15 
11.48 
-6.42 
Source: Compiled by Park and Lee (1998) from various primary sources. 
Note; Values are for 1996 except as noted. 
aFor Mexico, values are for 1993. 
bFor FDI Bowldebt, values are for 1995. 
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Comment Hong-Tack Chun 
Kim and Hwang examine whether FDI in Korea has positive effects on 
productivity in manufacturing industries. In addition, they investigate 
whether FDI plays a role in preventing currency crisis. 
In their investigation of the productivity effects of FDI in Korea, they 
use TFP as a measure of productivity in manufacturing industries. TFP is 
calculated as a residual in the conventional growth accounting framework. 
Growth in TFP is assumed to be a function of the growth rates of the 
FDI stock and the royalty stock, which is used as a proxy for imported 
technology from foreign countries. They use a random-effects model with 
instruments to avoid possible endogeneity between productivity effects 
and the independent variables. They found that for both the OLS and 
the random-effects model, growth in the FDI stock has a positive but 
insignificant effect on TFP growth in manufacturing industries. 
I have two comments on the productivity effects of FDI in Korea. My 
first comment is on the explanation for their finding that industry aggre- 
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gate data do not show a significant effect of FDI on productivity, contrary 
to case study evidence. As the authors suggest, this might be due to aggre- 
gation of data at the industry level in that the experiences of individual 
firms are not sufficient to have an impact at the aggregate level. Currently, 
firm-level analysis is almost impossible because data are lacking. However, 
a subsector-level analysis may show a significant productivity effect be- 
cause FDI is concentrated in a few subsectors, such as the chemical, elec- 
trical and electronics, and transport equipment industries. 
My second comment is on the specification of the TFP equation. R&D 
expenditures by large Korean firms have increased rapidly since the mid- 
1980s. Human capital has also increased in Korea. Rapid growth in R&D 
expenditures and human capital might have affected both TFP and FDI. 
This suggests that a variable for R&D expenditure or human capital, or 
variables for both, should be included in the TFP equation to avoid the 
omitted-variables problem. 
Let me turn to the role of FDI in a currency crisis. Kim and Hwang 
apply the probit estimation method of Frankel and Rose (1996) to pooled 
data from 1973 to 1994 for eighty-four developing countries to see whether 
FDI has an effect in preventing currency crashes and IMF rescue loans. 
The estimation results for currency crashes and IMF rescue loans are simi- 
lar to those of Frankel and Rose. 
The authors also calculate the predicted probabilities of currency 
crashes and IMF arrangements in six crisis-ridden countries, five Asian 
countries and Mexico, using the estimated coefficients and values of inde- 
pendent variables for 1996. They find that the probabilities of currency 
crisis and IMF arrangements in Korea are the highest among these coun- 
tries. They conclude that the high predicted probabilities of currency crash 
and IMF arrangements for Korea can be attributed to Korea’s relatively 
high proportion of short-term debt and low ratio of FDI flow to total 
debt. In addition, they argue that a higher proportion of capital inflow in 
the form of FDI could help to reduce the likelihood of future crises. 
A Frankel and Rose-type model examines the statistical correlation be- 
tween independent variables and a dependent variable without a struc- 
tural mechanism that causes currency crisis. Therefore, the estimation 
results might have been affected by the omission of an important indepen- 
dent variable, and an estimated correlation between a independent and 
dependent variable may not imply a causal relation. Furthermore, one 
should not apply estimation results from a Frankel and Rose-type model 
directly to a particular country without examining the structural mecha- 
nism that caused a currency crisis in that country. In the Korean case, it 
is now well known that a combination of terms-of-trade shock, policy 
missteps, and low foreign exchange reserves relative to short-term external 
debt led to the currency crisis. It is doubtful that a higher net inflow of 
FDI alone would have prevented the crisis, although the crisis might have 
been less severe with a higher net inflow of FDI. 
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Comment Yuri Nagataki Sasaki 
In the wake of the Asian currency crisis, many papers have sought a way 
to prevent such crises. This paper gives us a clue to finding the way. 
The paper is composed of two parts. The first part, a historical overview 
of FDI policy and the trend of FDI in Korea, offers a very convenient 
survey of the history and background of FDI policy in Korea. The second 
part examines the productivity effects of FDI in Korea and the role of 
FDI in a currency crisis. 
I have some comments on the second part of the paper, sections 9.4 
and 9.5. In section 9.4, the effect of FDI on productivity is examined and 
contrasted with the effect of royalties on productivity. Section 9.5 exam- 
ines the role of FDI as a safety net during a currency crisis and explains 
that FDI plays this role in contrast with other forms of debt. 
First, as the authors point out, it is said that foreign firms tend to locate 
in more productive sectors, and estimates of the impact of FDI on the 
productivity of domestic industries may often be biased upward. This pa- 
per uses industry-level data, not firm-level data, so the coefficients of FDI 
change are possibly biased upward. 
Second, the paper shows that FDI has had a positive effect on the TFP 
growth of Korea. But if the TFP growth rate of Korea is very low, FDI 
may play a very limited role in its total growth. For example, Young (1995) 
reported that average TFP growth of manufacturing in Korea during the 
period 1966-90 was estimated at 3 percent. Young also showed that TFP 
growth in East Asia is not as high as in the G-7 countries and concluded 
that East Asian countries may not enjoy learning-by-doing externalities. 
Third, the paper mentions that the predicted sign of royalty change, 
gamma in equation (3) ,  or 6, in table 9.5, is negative because royalties re- 
duce R&D. But there is no evidence that royalties reduce R&D and that 
FDI does not have a similar effect on R&D. It would be better to explain 
the difference between the effect of FDI and that of royalties. Or if one 
can get data on R&D in Korea, it might be interesting to test the effects 
of royalties and FDI on R&D directly. 
Fourth, table 9.1 shows that FDI inflows into Korea have increased time 
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Fig. 9C.1 Capital inflows: A ,  Thailand; B, Korea 
after time, as the Korean government has liberalized FDI policy. Although 
the data are annual and the sample size is small, it would be better to add 
some dummies to the equation to measure the effects of policy change. 
My last comment is on section 9.5: This paper proposes that the Korean 
government promote FDI in order to raise the ratio of FDI to total debt. 
But another way to raise the FDI ratio is to decrease other debts, espe- 
cially short-term debt. Large amounts of short-term debt-which can be 
promoted by countries in various ways, for example, by creating inter- 
national banking facilities or by pegging exchange rates-have a strong 
impact on currency crisis. Figure 9C.1 shows FDI inflow, portfolio in- 
vestment liabilities, and other liabilities in Thailand and Korea during 
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1980-96. These graphs are not strong evidence, but they show that FDI 
was stable but other debts grew rapidly just before the Asian currency 
crisis. Thus rapid growth in other debts, including large amounts of short- 
term debt, seems to have been one important factor in inducing the crisis. 
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